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Abstract
Fuel subsidies distort end-use prices below cost, resulting in overconsumption and huge 
environmental cost. On the other hand, the mark-up over cost due to the exercise of market 
power results in the social loss of consumer surplus. We open a new line of inquiry into the 
potential for a market-based solution from these two countervailing forces: can the two off-
setting distortions conceivably achieve a second- best optimum? Relying on dynamic panel 
techniques and gasoline market data for 68 developing countries, we uncover an excessive 
second-best subsidy offset to market power mark-up on the order of 4.5. Our results indi-
cate that the potential for policy failure strongly exceeds the potential for market failure in 
our model, and gasoline prices across our sample may not be aligned with vigorous anti-
climate change policy.
Keywords Gasoline · Fuel subsidies · Market power · Pass-through · Second-best · 
Developing countries
JEL Classification  C3 · L1 · L2 · Q4
1 Introduction
Fuel subsidies are often employed by developing countries1 as instruments to alleviate pov-
erty and promote social welfare. According to the IMF, global energy subsidies amounted 
to $5.3tn in 2015, with developing countries sacrificing, on average, around 7% (versus 
1.9% for OECD countries) of their GDP to provide these subsidies. The IMF computation 
of global fuel subsidies defines them as arising when consumer prices are below supply 
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1 This is particularly the case for net oil exporting or resource-rich countries where petroleum subsidies are 
often much larger. See IEA (2012) and Plante (2014).
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costs plus environmental costs and general consumption taxes, rather than simply the dif-
ference between consumer prices and supply costs. Policies to use subsidisation of this 
nature may arise for a variety of socio-political reasons including help for low income 
households, and, as the IMF suggests, the degree of distortion from the equilibrium price 
may be considerable. We are careful in this paper not to use the term welfare optimum 
to identify the second-best outcome that arises from the countervailing forces of market 
power and subsidy because we have not explicitly included estimates of the social cost of 
carbon.2 These would be needed if the aim was to pin down the welfare optimal outcome. 
For a sound and comprehensive treatment of that approach, see Parry et al. (2014). A major 
consensus in the fuel subsidy literature is that they distort prices and lead to socially inef-
ficient levels of consumption (e.g. Davis 2014; Coady et  al. 2017). First, they constitute 
a drain on government budgets, often resulting in scale imbalances. Second, they stimu-
late the overconsumption of oil resources, thereby limiting global efforts towards reduc-
ing greenhouse emissions. Third, the overconsumption arising from fuel subsidies indicate 
misallocation of scarce resources.3 Finally, fossil fuel subsidies encourage the “lock-in” for 
fossil-based technologies by limit the adoption of more efficient (low-carbon) technologies 
since they lower the opportunity cost of fossil fuels below consumers’ willingness to pay.4
On the other hand, a large body of evidence in the industrial organization literature 
indicates that the excessive mark-up arising from the exercise of market power results in 
producer cost inefficiency and the loss of consumer surplus (e.g. Martin 1988; Delis and 
Tsionas 2009). However, conservationists prefer the excessive mark-up over cost as a nec-
essary condition for capturing the external cost of environmental damage from fossil fuel 
consumption (see Medlock 2011). Although higher prices might eliminate overconsump-
tion and internalise the negative externality arising from pollution, deadweight losses can 
also arise from excessive mark-ups (Newbery 1995). The price distortion due to market 
power in fuel supply is only aligned with the environmental cost signal if it exceeds any 
market power distortion that applies to prices in general. While we do not have specific evi-
dence on this, retail petroleum supply is widely recognised to be dominated by large scale 
private and state-owned companies. It is also the case in many developing countries that 
retail petroleum prices are administered through state owned suppliers which may pursue 
both revenue-raising and socio-political goals. This factor could offset the market power 
impact and, if so, would contribute towards any finding that the subsidy effect dominated 
the market power effect in the determination of the price signals.5
Given the presence of these two market distortions (subsidies and market power); the 
problem facing the social planner6 is well encapsulated in some salient questions: is there 
a countervailing offset from these two opposing forces? Can these two offsetting distor-
tions conceivably achieve a second-best optimum? What is the net impact of these two 
2 We are indebted to a reviewer for emphasising this point.
3 It is almost always the case that high-subsidising countries are better off directing their resources towards 
high-priority areas in education, health, and infrastructure, which are likely to benefit low and middle-
income households (Coady et al. 2010).
4 These arguments underscore the growing consensus in current research and global policy discussions on 
the need to urgently reform fossil fuel subsidy is understandable. For instance, several notable international 
bodies such as the IMF, IEA, UN and IPCC all highlight the need to urgently reform fossil fuel subsidies, 
often citing the many adverse consequences of the wedges between costs and end-use energy prices.
5 These points are due to a reviewer.
6 This could be the government, an energy regulator or an international environmental agency. See New-
bery (1995) for discussions on the regulator’s dilemma in this trade-off.
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distortions? The intention in the paper is to investigate this trade-off between the upward 
pressure on fuel prices from exercise of market power and the downward pressure from 
fuel subsidies, recognising that both effects have an impact on the demand for emission-
creating fuel. Thus, the emissions impact is left implicit rather than being treated as an 
explicit emissions-directed policy.7 Since we have not attempted to take marginal external 
costs in the form of the social cost of carbon into account as well as the subsidy and mar-
ket power aspects, we must be clear that the analysis in this paper is about the trade-off 
between fuel price subsidy and market power alone. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to 
investigate the extent to which a subsidy to reduce the fuel price moves the economy away 
from the first best equilibrium that would prevail in the absence of market power. If market 
power is present as well then this may reduce the divergence from the optimum arising 
from a subsidy, if the market power effect stands in for what would be the impact of tax to 
reflect marginal external cost.
This potential trade-off is essentially reflected by the plots in Fig. 1, which illustrates 
the relationship between petroleum subsidy share of GDP and petroleum-related carbon 
emissions in 2013. As seen in Fig. 1, there is a positive correlation between emissions from 
petroleum use and fuel subsidies, demonstrating that high welfare-based petroleum subsi-
dies are not compatible with fossil-related emissions reduction.
A necessary condition for the design of policy instruments and interventions in energy 
markets is a clear understanding of the interaction between jointly reinforcing market fail-
ures. Second, understanding the trade-off between these market distortions provides val-
uable insight on the potential net effect of policy interventions. This is because policies 
targeted at one market failure may affect the outcome of policies required to address the 
other. To answer the interrelated questions above, we derive a price setting model for gaso-
line across developing countries which embodies fuel consumption subsidies and market 
concentration. Our aim is to provide a joint estimation of these market distortions and the 
implicit trade-off between both forces. As far as is known, this study is the first to assess 
the trade-off in gasoline markets in this way, and it is a timely contribution to the ongo-
ing discussion on the low-carbon development of emerging economies. For instance, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects a 50% rise in transport sector 
emissions by 2030, relative to 2015 levels; driven mainly by regional shifts in transport 
energy use.8 This study therefore assesses two of the critical determinants of these regional 
shifts.
To give a flavour of our approach, petroleum subsidies will be measured as the differ-
ence between domestic retail fuel prices and international spot prices, adjusted for trans-
port, distribution and retail costs, while marginal supply cost is the ex-refinery price simi-
larly adjusted; both variables are sourced from the IMF. Our empirical strategy embodies 
an instrumental variable (IV) system of equations where we combine a demand model with 
a model of supply aspects of the market. We are able to identify three important param-
eters: (i) a parameter representing the impact of gasoline subsidies (ii) a market conduct 
parameter to capture the role of market concentration, and (iii)  the semi-elasticity of 
7 We owe this clarification to a reviewer.
8 The IPCC projects the share of non-OECD countries in transport sector energy use to reach 46% by 2030, 
up from 36% in 2014.
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demand, to account for consumer behaviour. Our empirical tests are based on a compre-
hensive data set for 68 developing countries, covering the period 2000–2013.9
We provide econometric evidence that the distortions arising from petroleum subsidies 
far exceed the inefficiency resulting from market concentration. Specifically, the subsidy 
effect is more than four times the market power mark-up. These fuel subsidy distortions are 
consistent with our finding of some incomplete cost pass-through into retail gasoline prices, 
which we estimate at 0.67 in the short run and 0.84 in the long run, i.e. after the elapse of 
5 years. The short-run estimate is significantly different from one at the one percent signifi-
cance level, but the long-run estimate is not. Underlying our findings is the instrumenta-
tion for gasoline subsidies, which reveals the overbearing influence of the equity objectives 
of oil-producing countries, which are fulfilled by endowment distribution through end-use 
petroleum subsidies. Our results therefore indicate that the deadweight loss from policy 
failure far exceeds the inefficiency losses arising from market failure/mispricing.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section  2 provides a review of 
related literature on pass-through and market power. Sections 3, 4 and 5 describe the theo-
retical model, the estimation strategy and estimation issues. Section 6 describes our data 
set, while Sect. 7 contains the econometric results and study findings. Section 8 concludes.
2  Related Literature
Two literature resources can be drawn upon in this paper: (i) the evidence on limited cost 
pass-through/impact of subsidies on end-use fuel prices and (ii) the evidence on the impact 
of market power in domestic fuel markets, since market power provides a countervailing 
second-best influence on domestic prices that may offset the impact of national fuel pricing 
policies. We reflect on each literature in turn.
Although the issue of petroleum subsidies has received considerable attention in the 
literature,10 there is hardly any cross-country evidence11 regarding the extent to which mar-
ginal cost is transmitted into retail petroleum prices. The IMF (2015) subsidy definition 
gives some indication that fuel price subsidies fail to cover externality costs and therefore 
implies that market power or administered pricing fails to internalize the externalities. Tak-
ing the IMF’s (2015) suggestion as a starting point therefore, the purpose of the paper is to 
explore this possibility further in a systematic panel data econometric approach.
Accounting for marginal cost pass-through is a crucial starting point for the analysis of 
the net effects of distortions above/below cost arising from market power and subsidies. In 
short, marginal cost represents the theoretical reference point against which both distor-
tions are evaluated, since the distortions embody wedges between prices and costs (see 
Newberry 1995; Hall 1988 for a discussion on the intuitive importance of the price–cost 
relationship).
A few IMF and World Bank working papers, such as Baig et al. (2007), Coady et al. 
(2010) and Kojima (2012) have considered crude oil price pass-through in fuel markets 
across several countries. Other studies include Beers and Strand (2013) who estimated the 
10 For instance, Plante (2014), Davis (2014), Larsen and Shah (1992).
11 The closest relatives are mostly country-specific (especially US) crude oil pass-through studies such as 
Borenstein and Shepard (2002), Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Atil et al. (2014).
9 Our sample size is strictly determined by availability of reliable and consistent data on supply costs and 
retail prices of gasoline.
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impact of a range of social and political variables on end retail petroleum prices. A key 
challenge with the studies above is that pass-through is simply derived as the ratio of abso-
lute change in domestic retail prices to the absolute change in international crude prices. 
Implicit to this pass-through approach is the assumption of homogenous market conditions, 
since the studies ignored cross-country heterogeneity in their analysis.
More recently, Beers and Strand (2013) addressed the issue of heterogeneity in their 
pass-through analysis by controlling for a range of social and political variables. However, 
as in the previous studies, they also employed international crude oil price as a measure of 
world fuel price. Further, their model also ignored market aspects relating to market con-
centration and national fuel price policy.
This paper makes several contributions to the empirical literature. First, none of the pre-
vious studies evaluated “complete” cost pass-through to retail petroleum products, consid-
ering their use of crude oil price as a single representation of marginal cost.12 Based on 
this approach, the studies above implicitly assume that crude oil prices can fully reflect or 
approximate the marginal cost of refined petroleum products.13 Asplund et al. (2000) and 
Meyler (2009) show the two crucial stages between crude oil prices and retail prices: (i) 
refining and (ii)  distribution activities. Hence, to the extent that these downstream costs 
contribute to supply costs, the widely adopted crude price approach ignores significant var-
iations in other cost drivers.
In contrast to all the previous cross-country studies, we directly investigate marginal 
cost pass-through for gasoline. Ideally, we would like to have analysed a wider range of 
fuel commodities the focus on gasoline at least allows us to develop a feasible modelling 
Fig. 1  Petroleum Subsidy % of GDP versus Carbon Emissions in 2013
12 Crude prices represent less than 60% of the marginal cost of supplying a litre of gasoline, with signifi-
cant cost elements arising from downstream segments of the production chain relating to refining, distribu-
tion, marketing and taxes. See for example https ://www.eia.gov/petro leum/gasdi esel/ or https ://www.giz.de/
exper tise/downl oads/giz-2015-en-ifp20 14.pdf.
13 In part, the dearth of evidence on marginal cost pass-through reflects the difficulty in obtaining observ-
able data on marginal supply costs for refined petroleum.
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approach given the limited availability of data for a wider range of products. This approach 
is arguably important for a number of reasons. First, the underlying economic theory indi-
cates that firms’ supply (pricing) decisions are based on changes in (slope of the) marginal 
cost. The price-marginal cost relationship also provides useful insight on the existing mar-
ket structure via information on seller mark-up.
Second, our marginal cost approach allows us to capture the downstream segment of the 
gasoline supply chain. Borenstein et al. (1997) showed that pass-through in gasoline mar-
kets reflect downstream factors such as inventory adjustment, market power of sellers etc., 
which are impossible to observe using crude price data. Moreover, inferences about wedges 
between costs and retail prices are likely to be more reliable for a marginal cost analysis, 
given that market interventions employed by governments usually occur in the downstream 
part of the petroleum supply chain.14 Hence, unless a marginal cost approach is adopted, it 
is impossible to fully assess the wedge between supply cost and retail prices. This makes it 
practically impossible to estimate distortions above/below costs. In reality, both distortions 
are intimately related to cost pass-through in petroleum markets, and understanding their 
role can form a basis for better-designed reforms.
Turning now to the market conduct and market power literature, we use this to take the 
first steps in setting up the econometric model. To derive a price equation for our pass-
through analysis, it is necessary to model the industry behaviour into which the national 
policy is embedded. In this case we draw on the industrial organization literature that stems 
from the work of Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Weyl and Fabin-
ger (2013) to identify market conduct; and which proceeds through many applications to 
different industries such as Lopez et  al. (2002) on the food processing industries, Shaf-
fer (1993) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) on banking systems, and Kutlu and Sickles 
(2012) on airlines.
The early work in this field established the necessary and sufficient conditions for iden-
tification of market conduct parameters from aggregated industry wide data. Subsequent 
applications estimated the model to establish regulatory and efficiency implications in 
particular industries. Corts (1999) showed that the equilibrium concepts in the analysis 
required careful specification of the dynamic oligopoly game assumptions involved, and 
Kutlu and Sickles (2012) derived a particular random coefficients approach for the estima-
tion of market conduct parameters in dynamic games.
In this paper, we outline the market conduct parameter analysis and then show that the 
identification issue is resolved using a theorem of Lau (1982) that exploits the availability 
of prior information on industry marginal cost. We address the issue of dynamics by using 
the insights of Borenstein and Shepard (2002) and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) on lagged 
responses by market agents, given that our panel data sample allows us to exploit the GMM 
estimation procedures within a dynamic panel data analysis (Arellano and Bond 1991).15
15 See Bond (2002) for a useful survey.
14 These extensive interventions include pump price regulation, lower fuel taxes, reduction in state-owned 
refinery margins, direct post-tax subsidies etc., which occur ex-crude oil prices.
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3  Modelling Fuel Markets
We proceed by assuming a domestic industry producing a homogeneous output Y in each 
of I firms: yi so that Y =
∑
i yi . The market price of the homogeneous output is P and the 
market demand depends on this price and a vector of demand-shifting variables z:
The market demand curve is assumed to be invertible: P(Y) = F−1
(
Y;퐳�
)
 . This market 
structure is sufficiently general to accommodate the special case where a state-owned com-
pany sets administered prices that incorporate a subsidy element as we show below. To 
develop an industry wide pricing model, we follow a widely used approach, e.g. Appel-
baum (1982), Bresnahan (1982) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013). In Weyl and Fabinger 
(2013), the authors treat pass-through of a specific tax as a motivating force for a wide 
range of comparative static effects across the field of applied economics. Our model rep-
resents a simplified version of their extremely rich general asymmetric imperfect competi-
tion model but one that is tailored to the limited availability of data. The key constraint is 
that their generalised market conduct variable requires interactions which in practice with 
limited data can only be handled by using relative market shares. For this reason, we have 
adopted the approach which includes the HHI market concentration index in the specifica-
tion. The typical firm’s output decision in the absence of administered prices is
In (2), MCj is the firm’s marginal cost, 휀 ≡ −(dY∕dP)(P∕Y) is the market price elastic-
ity of demand written as a positive value, sj . is the market output share of the firm indexed 
j, and finally the term 휃j = 1 + d
∑
i≠j yi∕dyj is referred to as the conjectural variation used 
by firm j in calculating the effect of its output change on the behaviour of the other firms; 
sometimes it is simply called the firm’s ‘conduct parameter’. The firm knows that a one-
unit increase in its own output increases total industry supply by one unit plus the per-
ceived impact of the firm’s one-unit output increase on the output behaviour of all the other 
firms.
We are analysing industry-wide data; therefore, we aggregate from the individual firm’s 
equilibrium condition in (2). The weighted average Lerner Index for the industry is
Here, three transformations have been made. The share-weighted marginal costs are 
written as the aggregated industry marginal cost,MC . Then the individual firm market con-
duct parameters are assumed to be constant across all firms in the industry so that 훩 repre-
sents the industry market conduct parameter. Finally, H ≡ ∑i s2i  is defined as the Herfind-
ahl–Hirschman index of market concentration.16 In the Weyl and Fabinger (2013) version 
of (3) the concentration index is subsumed into the general conduct parameter in cases 
where each firm’s market share is identical. We can estimate the additive price equation to 
represent the supply side of the market by writing from (3)
(1)Y = F
(
P, 퐳�
)
(2)P
(
1 −
(
sj휃j∕휀
))
= MCj
(3)LI =
(
P −
∑
i
sjMCj
)
∕P = (P −MC∕P) =
∑
j
(
s2
j
휃j∕휀
)
= (훩∕휀)H
16 Expressing market shares as decimals means that H lies between zero (highly competitive) and one 
(highly concentrated).
1626 M. O. Adetutu, T. G. Weyman-Jones 
1 3
In the final term on the right-hand side of Eq. (4), we have used the parameterization of 
휂 ≡ 휀∕P ≡ −(1∕Y)(dY∕dP) = −d ln Y∕dP . This term is the semi-elasticity of demand. The 
market conduct parameter is interpreted as:
when there is positive market power, the proportional price marup over marginal cost is 
H∕휀 . with the limit of 1∕휀 in the case of monopoly.
Many countries ensure that retail gasoline prices are administered for social and politi-
cal purposes and we model this by superimposing on the equilibrium pricing rule a national 
energy pricing policy in each country which is represented here by an additional variable 
S ≥ 0 representing the subsidy designed to ameliorate the income distribution effects of 
global energy price changes or to fulfil other environmental objectives.
There is an issue about the form of regulated market mechanism that is used in coun-
tries applying the type of fuel subsidies that we are discussing.17 A simple subsidy in an 
otherwise unregulated market does fit exactly into our framework in Eqs.  (2) and (3). In 
countries where the consumer protection takes the form of administratively capped retail 
prices, pass through does not necessarily reflect the same comparative static effects that 
would operate in an unregulated market, therefore our derivations can in that case only be 
regarded as a first-order approximation and the coefficients on input prices and concentra-
tion will only approximately reflect pass-through and market power aspects. Nevertheless, 
a market equilibrium will still emerge. The administrative price cap changes the shape of 
the market demand curve (it has both horizontal and downward sloping segments) but pro-
duction is still located at the intersection with the industry marginal cost curve. In this 
event, a price-capped profit maximising monopolist recovers its profitability by eliminat-
ing any X-inefficiency that would be tolerated in an unregulated monopoly, as suggested 
by Leibenstein (1966). In this way, the decomposition in Eq. (4) can still be applied as a 
modelling framework.
After adding exogenous supply side variables, 퐱 , we obtain, where 𝛼 < 0 in the subsidy 
case, ( 𝛼 > 0 in the case of an excise tax).
This expression of the industry equilibrium gives rise to a second-best analysis, since 
totally differentiating (5) produces
This informs us that the equilibrium price will be unchanged at P = P̄ if the increased 
exercise of market power ΔH > 0 is exactly offset by the effect of an energy price subsidy 
ΔS > 0 in the trade-off ratio: −훼휂∕훩 . In short, the role of market power (captured through 
the critical parameters 훩 and 휂 ) is a countervailing force that may increase pass-through 
and offset government fuel subsidy policy or the general use of administered prices for 
policy reasons. Consequently, the concentration effect, dH and the subsidy effect dS allow 
for an evaluation of the net impact of country wise variation in the fuel price policies on 
(4)P = MC +
[
(훩∕휀)H
]
P = MC +
[
(훩∕휂)H
]
훩 = 0→ zeromarket power or competition
0 < 𝛩 ≤ 1 → positivemarket power
(5)P = MC + 훼S + (훩∕휂)H + 퐱�훃
(6)dH∕dS|P=P̄ = −𝛼𝜂∕𝛩
17 We are grateful to a reviewer for raising this issue and suggesting this discussion.
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end-use prices. Our model therefore allows for an analysis of the countervailing equity or 
environmental price distortion through administered prices available to offset the ineffi-
ciency arising from the impact of market power, and vice versa. The two distortions work-
ing to offset each other could conceivably achieve a second-best optimum.
Taking Eq.  (5) allied with Eq.  (1) for the market demand; we obtain a simultaneous 
equation system for the market. This has the effect of making the equation system given by 
(1) and (5) recursive: the price variable in the demand function in (1) can be replaced by 
the equilibrium price from Eq. (5) without adding endogenous variables. Then if the semi-
elasticity of demand parameter, 휂 , can be consistently estimated and identified from (1) it 
can be used to identify the market conduct parameter 훩.
An issue that is critical to the estimation of the model is the identification of the param-
eters of interest. Three parameters are critical in particular: the impact of the subsidy 
policy,훼 , the impact of the market conduct parameter,훩 , the semi-elasticity of demand, 휂 . 
However, these enter non-linearly, and there is the further complication of the role of mar-
ginal cost, MC . The analysis in Lau (1982) is helpful here because if there is prior informa-
tion about the level of marginal cost, then the market conduct parameter cannot be identi-
fied in only a very limited case.
A second issue that may be critical arises from Corts’ (1999) observation that dynamic 
considerations can be important. Kutlu and Sickles (2012) also consider the issue 
of dynamics. These authors directly model the explicit dynamic games under differ-
ent assumptions. On the other hand, Borenstein and Shephard (Borenstein and Shepard 
2002) show that costly adjustment of production and inventories mean that fuel prices will 
respond to crude oil shocks with a lag, and that the adjustment of prices depends on market 
power. Hence, we exploit the role of partial adjustment within dynamic panel data model-
ling to address the issue of dynamics.
4  Estimation Strategy
To estimate our specified models, we assume the existence of a panel data sample for 
n = 1…N countries and t = 1… T  time periods. We expect N to be considerably larger 
than T. Equation (6) below is the estimating equation analogous to the long-run relation-
ship between retail fuel prices, marginal cost and other exogenous factors. However, given 
the dynamic considerations above, it is very likely that retail fuel price adjustments to 
changing costs would be greater in the long run. This is consistent with the widely held 
notion in the literature, which tends to distinguish between short-run (SR) and long run 
(LR) elasticities. Additionally, in practice, the implementation of changes in fuel price pol-
icies (relating to taxes and subsidies) typically occur with considerable lags (see Alm et al. 
2009). Borenstein and Shepard (2002)demonstrate the same impact from market power. 
Hence, we introduce the slow adjustment of retail fuel prices using a partial adjustment 
mechanism,
where Pnt is the domestic end-use price in country n in period t. Hnt captures the role of 
market concentration in domestic fuel markets. Snt represents the subsidy or administered 
fuel pricing policy, 퐱′
nt
 is a vector of supply-side characteristics that determine prices; 
휃n and 휆t are unobserved country and year effects respectively; 휀nt represents random 
(6)Pnt = 훾Pnt−1 + 훼1MCnt + 훼2Snt + 훼3Hnt + 퐱�nt훃 + 휃n + 휆t + 휀nt
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disturbance terms. 훼1 = 휕Pnt∕휕MCnt is the degree of cost pass-through and 훾 is the adjust-
ment speed of retail prices, so that SR and LR pass-through18 can be written as:
If 훼1 = 1 , we can conclude that there is full pass-through in the short run, and 휁LR = 1 
implies full pass through in the long run, while 𝛼1 < 1 and 𝜁LR < 1 indicate incomplete 
pass-through of international prices: a wedge exists between the international fuel and 
domestic prices. On the other hand, 훼2∕훼3 indicates the second-best trade-off between mar-
ket power and fuel subsidy. The model system is completed by the demand function based 
on (1) and specified in (8):
where, as in the price equation in (6), Pnt is retail fuel price. 퐳′nt is a vector of logged 
demand-side characteristics that determine prices; 휔n and 휌t are unobserved country and 
year effects respectively; 휖nt are random disturbance terms. We have given the demand 
function in (8) the same adjustment and error structure in principle as the price Eq.  (6), 
since lagged responses in demand to changes in fuel prices and income are to be expected, 
given that consumers require significant time to turn over their energy-using capital stock 
(mostly motor vehicles in the case of gasoline). Note also that the coefficient on the domes-
tic price variable in (8) is the semi-elasticity: 훿 = −휂 = −휀∕P . The term −훼1휂 = −훼1훿 
measures the market conduct parameter. Our objective is to estimate the equation system 
given by (6) and (8).
5  Estimation Issues
There are practical econometric problems with identifying the key parameters in this study 
via the estimation of the equation set (6) and (8) above. First, they are dynamic economet-
ric models that can be complicated by the endogeneity of the lagged price and demand 
variables. Second, this problem may be compounded by the endogeneity of the subsidy 
variable, Snt : there are at least three sources of endogeneity pertaining to the fuel subsidy 
variable in Eq. (6). First, 휃n captures fixed unobserved country heterogeneity, which might 
include persistent factors (e.g. policy preferences, socio-political and climatic conditions) 
that are approximately fixed over the time frame of our data sample. Because the subsidy 
variable Snt is likely to be influenced by these time-invariant factors, 휃n is potentially cor-
related with Snt.
Secondly, there is great potential for reverse-causality, such that Pnt could influence Snt . 
For instance, as shown by the properties of our data set, the fuel subsidisers are largely 
resource endowed countries who attempt to shield end-use consumers from rising fuel 
prices by intervening (with large subsidies) to limit the degree of cost pass-through to 
domestic fuel prices. Hence, petroleum subsidies are often higher during periods of higher 
petroleum prices (see Coady et al. 2010). Furthermore, since governments in some of these 
countries are known to set end-user prices within certain thresholds, the size of the fuel 
(7)휁SR = 훼1; 휁LR = 훼1∕1 − 훾
(8)ln Ynt = 휑 ln Ynt−1 + 훿Pnt + 퐳�nt훍 + 휔n + 휌t + 휖nt
18 The long-run estimates of the subsidy and market power effects are derived in similar fashion.
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subsidy is a function of the target price. In effect, the target retail fuel price influences the 
size and persistence of the subsidy offset.
Thirdly, 휀nt includes other random shocks which may explain the variations in Snt . For 
instance, international oil price shocks or geo-political developments can affect sampled 
countries in different ways, e.g. oil rich subsidisers are likely to experience shocks to rev-
enues or incomes during periods of negative oil price shocks which may limit their budget-
ary scope for petroleum subsidies. This problem could further complicate the endogeneity 
problem, since Snt would be correlated with 휀nt . This will bias the estimated coefficient on 
Snt downwards towards zero.19
Given the endogeneity issues discussed above, estimating (6) or (8) under the assump-
tion of orthogonality of the regressors is not likely to produce consistent estimates. Hence, 
estimating the model parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce biased esti-
mates. Dynamic panel data techniques offer solutions to the problems of endogeneity and 
heterogeneity identified above. First, we can control for the selection problem based on 
time-invariant country-specific effects 휃n by applying first differences to (6)20:
This removes the country-specific effects, but the transformed error term is now 
correlated with the right hand side variables: Δ휀nt =
(
휀nt − 휀nt−1
)
 is correlated with 
ΔPnt−1 =
(
Pnt−1 − Pnt−2
)
 since corr
(
Pnt−1, 휀nt−1
)
≠ 0 . This still means that OLS is incon-
sistent and hence, panel data (FE) estimators do not provide consistent estimates. How-
ever, we can search for instrumental variables correlated with ΔPnt−1 =
(
Pnt − Pnt−1
)
 but 
orthogonal to Δ휀nt =
(
휀nt − 휀nt−1
)
 , with many possible instrumental variables arising 
from the moment conditions on the error terms. In this case, the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator is appealing. Ignoring the other exogenous variables for the 
moment, the instrument matrix for each cross section is the following array21:
The moment equations are:
where Δ훆n =
(
Δ휀n3…Δ휀nT
)� . Applying a quadratic loss criterion with weighting matrix 
inversely proportional to the variances of the moments leads to the Arellano–Bond (AB) 
two-step difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991) where the Δ휺̂
n
 are consist-
ent estimates of the first difference residuals from a preliminary consistent estimator. A 
one-step estimator is available with a simpler weighting matrix which does not depend 
on any estimated parameters. The two-step estimator offers a small gain in efficiency over 
the one-step but suffers from downward bias in its standard errors. However, Windmeijer 
(2005) provides the finite sample correction to the standard errors of the two-step estimator.
(9)ΔPnt = 훾ΔPnt−1 + 훼1ΔMCnt + 훼2ΔSnt + 훼3ΔHnt + Δ퐱�nt훃 + Δ휆t + Δ휀nt
(10)퐙n =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
Pn1 0 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 … …
… … 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 Pn1 …
0
⋮
PnT−2
⎤⎥⎥⎦
(11)E
(
퐙nΔ훆n
)
= 0;n = 1…N
19 Similar arguments are applicable to the endogeneity of retail prices within the demand model in (14). 
See for instance Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for some arguments on price endogeneity within demand 
functions.
20 Similar arguments apply to Eq. (11).
21 This instrument matrix can be expanded by adding the exogenous variables.
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The difference GMM estimator uses lagged levels of the dependent variable as instru-
ments for the first difference equation, but these may be weak instruments. Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) also introduced the system GMM estimator 
which uses lagged differences as instruments in the levels equation. One relevant attribute 
of the GMM estimator is that, apart from using ‘internal instruments’ (i.e. lagged values of 
the instrumented variables), it permits the inclusion of ‘external instruments’, which allows 
us to exploit all the information available in our data sample.22
Fitting Eqs. (6) and (8) in the first-difference, estimating form is the starting point of the 
analysis. To compare parameter values of interest, i.e. 훿, 휀, 휂,훩, 훼1훼2, 훼3 , it is necessary to 
have a consistent set of transformations for these equations, which we set out as follows:
𝛿 = ?̂? and therefore ?̂? = ?̂?P̄nt  semi-elasticity, i.e. percentage change in demand from a 
1-unit price change in currency units (US$PPP) identified 
using (8) and transformation to elasticity at sample mean
?̂?1 = 𝜕Pnt∕𝜕MCnt ⇒ ?̂?1
[
MCnt∕P̄nt
]
  elasticity of domestic price with respect to marginal 
cost (pass through) from (9)
?̂?2 = ΔPnt∕ΔSnt  response of domestic price with respect to fuel subsidies from (9).
?̂?3 = −?̂?∕?̂? ⇒ ?̂? = −?̂?3?̂? = −?̂?3𝛿  market conduct parameter identified using (6) and (8).
  
The price equation in this set-up is linear with variable elasticities while the demand 
equation can be generally log-linear but with price entering as the level of the variable so 
that the semi-elasticity is identified and estimated, allowing for the estimation and identifi-
cation of the market conduct term.
6  Data
Our data sample spans the period 2000–2013 for 68 developing countries across a broad 
geographical coverage which is a good representative sample of developing countries, (see 
“Appendix” for a list of sampled countries). We define petroleum subsidies following the 
widely used “price-gap”23 approach (e.g. Larsen and Shah 1992; IMF 2013), measured 
as the difference between domestic retail fuel prices and international reference prices, 
adjusted for transport, distribution and retail costs.
While the reference prices reflect the price of petroleum on a competitive (undistorted) 
international market, the domestic prices reflect the end-user prices. The reference prices 
are adjusted for each country using downstream cost data (see IEA 1999). For instance, 
the reference price for a petroleum exporter is the export border price (fob) plus internal 
distribution and VAT, whereas for an importing country, it is the import border price (this 
included product cost, insurance and freight) plus internal distribution cost and VAT. Both 
22 For instance, in our GMM estimations relying on the STATA package “xtabond2”, we include two dif-
ferent measures of resource endowment as excluded instruments. See results section for details.
23 See Plante (2014) for some discussions on the advantages of the price-gap approach.
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measures are taken from the cross-country fuel price survey obtained from IMF Fiscal 
Affairs Department. See Table 8 of the “Appendix” for the top “subsidisers” in our sample.
For the supply model, the dependent variable is the annual average retail pump-price of 
gasoline in country n for time period t, measured in $US per litre. The primary independ-
ent variable, the marginal supply cost, is the wholesale price at regional hubs,24 plus down-
stream transportation and distribution costs, also measured in $US per litre. Both price 
series were obtained from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department and were deflated using the 
consumer price index (CPI), (2011 = 100), which we obtained from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) database.
For market concentration, the main challenge is the lack of appropriate data on mar-
ket shares across the downstream segment of petroleum markets in developing countries 
(Bacon and Kojima 2010). To address this problem, we compute the Herfindhal-Hirschman 
index (HHI) across sampled countries using two facts and assumptions. First, one of the 
main attributes of the petroleum industry is the extensive vertical integration of the supply 
chain, which usually encompasses production, refining, distribution and marketing (Bar-
rera-Rey 1995; OECD 2013). Second, refiners own a large portion of retail outlets or have 
strong, restrictive contractual relationships with gasoline retailers, and this type of refiner-
retailer relationship appears stronger in developing jurisdictions of the world due to weak 
levels of corporate governance and regulatory effectiveness (Marchak 2003).
Given the discussions above, we exploit the strong vertical integration across develop-
ing regions to compute the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) Hnt, following three steps. 
First, we collected annual production information across domestic refiners and downstream 
operators from the “Worldwide Petroleum Survey”, which covers operating data for 650 
operators across our sample. Second, because for many countries, petroleum demand 
exceeds domestic refinery capacity, we treated supply from imports as an alternative pro-
ducer with its own market share: we collected the import data from the US Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) database. Third, we then derived the market share for each 
producer as the ratio of their output to total market supply. From here, it is a small step to 
derive HHI, which we calculated for each country as the summation of the squared market 
shares. As shown in Table 1, our computed HHI estimates show a high degree of market 
concentration across our sample, and they are consistent with estimates in Kojima et  al. 
(2010), Bacon and Kojima (2010) and Sharma and Gundimeda (2017) who measured mar-
ket concentration for some Sub-Saharan Africa and Asian countries.
In addition to controlling for market concentration via the HHI, we also specified a 
variable in 퐱′
nt
 to control for the impact of prevailing national supply constraints within 
our model by including changes in inventories/stocks (Marion and Muehlegger 2011). We 
obtain information on gasoline stock changes from the IEA database. For the demand equa-
tion, the dependent variable is gasoline consumption, taken from the US Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA) database. The demand shifters in 퐳′
nt
 are income and population. 
Both variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample, which is an unbalanced panel of 
68 countries over the period 2000–2013.
24 For oil exporting countries, this is the domestic refinery-gate cost adjusted for downstream costs, while 
for importing countries, marginal costs as derived using the nearest producer-exporter using downstream 
costs that reflect transport distances from producing areas.
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7  Results
7.1  Endogeneity of Fuel Subsidy
We rigorously examine the possible endogeneity of fuel subsidies using the Hausman 
specification test, which requires the identification of an exogenous variable that influ-
ences gasoline price subsidies but does not directly influence retail gasoline prices. It is 
well established in the literature (e.g. IEA 2012; van Benthem 2015) that oil producing 
countries tend to transfer or distribute oil rents to their citizens as part of a social welfare 
package using fuel subsidies. Hence, we use resource endowment (represented by petro-
leum reserves, obtained from the EIA database)25 to instrument for the endogenous subsidy 
variable.
In the first stage of the Hausman test, we estimate an OLS model where we specified Snt 
as a function of resource endowment ( Endownt ) and other exogenous variables in (9). We 
find the coefficient on Endownt to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that oil-endowed countries are more likely to intervene in domestic gasoline 
markets via subsidies. Hence, Endownt can be considered as a valid instrument for Snt . In 
the second stage of the Hausman test, the residual from the Snt model is then specified as an 
explanatory variable in the price model in (9), and we find the estimated parameter on the 
added residual to be statistically significantly different from zero.26 Hence, we reject the 
null that Snt is exogenous, confirming our suspicion that it is endogenous within the price 
model (9). We repeat the Hausman specification test using the alternative measure “fuel 
share of total export”, which we obtained from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) data-
base. We obtain the same underlying results in qualitative terms. Consequently, we proceed 
with our GMM model set-up which allows us to address the complications arising from the 
lagged dependent variables, as well as the endogeneity of Snt.
7.2  Pass‑Through Regressions
Our main pass-through results are reported in Table 2, which we estimated in levels.27 The 
resulting marginal cost coefficient in the levels specification lends itself to the intuitive 
interpretation of a cent-for-cent pass-through, which is theoretically more meaningful (see 
Meyler 2009; Nakamura and Zerom 2010). Moreover, the pass-through coefficient from a 
logged pricing rule is an exponent and the prices are not additive. It is also the case that 
the equation in levels will better capture pass-through for instances where marginal supply 
costs rise significantly, which might be smoothened by the logged model.
25 Given the fixed effects in our analysis, this external instrument is appealing because it varies across sam-
pled countries, as well as over time. Second, and more importantly, this resource endowment variable is 
exogenous to the demand and supply side of our model, since petroleum reserves are exogenously deter-
mined by nature. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the instrument is less likely to be plagued by endo-
geneity concerns. The use of petroleum reserves as an instrument could focus on the cross-sectional varia-
tion only but even though reserves are exogenously determined by nature that does not mean that measured 
reserve estimates are fixed across time since engineering estimates are revised even when exploration effort 
is unchanged. Consequently, we argue that our present intertemporal variation approach is less liable to 
measurement error.
26 Results are available upon request.
27 We do not explore the log specification given that some of our variables have zeros and negative values.
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The first column of Table  2 (OLS-1) presents estimates of the standard pass-through 
regression in (9) where we estimated a pooled OLS model as a baseline. The specification 
in the second column (OLS-2) includes fixed country effects to account for constant dif-
ferences in gasoline price setting conditions across countries. Our main results are derived 
from the SYS-GMM specification in the third column where we use petroleum reserves as 
an external instrument for petroleum subsidies. To check the sensitivity of our results, we 
re-estimate the GMM model using fuel share of export as the excluded instrument, column 
4. In general, the GMM results (columns 3 and 4) are stable and sensible, with the coef-
ficient of the lagged retail gasoline price lying between the baseline OLS and FE estimates 
(Roodman 2009). For the IV specification results to be reliable, it is important to ensure 
that two critical conditions are met: (1) instrument relevance and (2) instrument validity, 
i.e. the instrument (s) ought to be correlated with the endogenous regressors and at the 
same time orthogonal to the random errors.
While the relevance of our instruments is confirmed by the Hausman specification test 
above, we need to cast some light on the orthogonality conditions. Within the GMM speci-
fication, we are able to test for instrument validity based on overidentifying restrictions 
in the context of an overidentified model where l > k, i.e. there are l excluded instruments 
more than k right-hand endogenous variables. In this case, we can use the Hansen (1982) 
test of overidentifying restrictions, which is a joint test of the hypotheses that the instru-
ments, excluded and included, are independently distributed of the error process and that 
they are properly excluded from the model. As shown in Table 2, the 휒2 p value on the 
Hansen J statistic on the GMM estimates are 0.165 and 0.144 respectively, failing to reject 
the null that our instruments are valid. We see in columns (3) and (4) that the parameter 
estimates across both specifications are qualitatively similar, so that we can conclude that 
our main results appear robust to alternative choice of instruments.
Focusing on these GMM results, it can be seen that most of the coefficients are in line 
with expectations and they are largely statistically significant. Both GMM regressions 
reflect incomplete pass-through. The short-run pass through coefficient in the SYS-
GMM specification in the third column of Table  2, where we use petroleum reserves 
as an external instrument for petroleum subsidies, is 0.67 with a standard error of 0.14 
indicating that in the short-run pass through is significantly less than unity or 100% at 
the one percent significance level. The intertemporal partial adjustment coefficient indi-
cates that it takes around 5 years to return to equilibrium after a price shock. The long 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Observations
Retail gasoline price ($ US per litre) 1.158 0.764 819
Marginal cost ($ US per litre) 0.853 0.323 819
Gasoline demand (thousand barrels per day) 72846.19 200891.9 819
Per capita income (2011 US $ ppp) 9690.07 15793.94 819
Total population (million, people) 68.78 207.05 819
HHI (sum of square of market shares) 6399.27 3283.6 819
Fuel subsidy ($ US per litre) 0.091 0.207 819
Stock changes (mtoe) − 18.17 352.03 819
Resource endowment (petroleum reserves, bbl) 4.95 17.59 819
Fuel share of total export (%) 20.46 30.13 819
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run pass-through coefficient is 0.84 indicating the possibility of some incomplete pass-
through even after 5 years, but the value is not significantly different from unity at the 
one percent level of significance. Hence, our point estimate is that only around 8 cents 
of a 10 cent shock in costs is passed through to retail gasoline prices in the long run. In 
the short run the short-fall is much greater. Moving on to the two sources of price dis-
tortions, the presence of a fuel subsidy regime is associated with lower retail gasoline 
prices, given that the coefficient on the subsidy variable is consistently negative and 
statistically significant at 1% across all estimated models (see Table  2). As expected, 
the mark-up on prices arising from the exercise of market power is reflected by the posi-
tive coefficient on HHI which indicates that increased market concentration results in 
Table 2  Pass-through regressions
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signifi-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in 
the first differenced residuals. These are asymptotically distributed N(0,1) under the null of no serial cor-
relation. Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically Chi square distributed under the 
null of instrument validity. Chi square p value are reported
Dep.var: Pd
nt
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pd
nt−1
0.312*** 0.168*** 0.204*** 0.206***
(0.117) (0.048) (0.053) (0.055)
Pw
nt
≡ MCnt 0.446*** 0.758*** 0.670*** 0.643***
(0.117) (0.140) (0.139) (0.152)
Snt − 1.003*** − 0.809*** − 1.093*** − 1.113***
(0.155) (0.114) (0.074) (0.088)
HHInt 0.187*** 0.131 0.198*** 0.183***
(0.042) (0.176) (0.056) (0.060)
Stocknt − 0.001 −  0.010 − 0.017*** − 0.017***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.256*** 0.414*** 0.239*** 0.269***
(0.069) (0.135) (0.085) (0.100)
Long-run Estimates
Pass-through 0.648*** 0.911*** 0.842*** 0.809***
(0.091) (0.140) (0.145) (0.161)
Subsidy − 1.457*** − 0.973*** − 1.372*** − 1.402***
(0.053) (0.133) (0.079) (0.104)
Market concentration 0.272*** 0.158 0.249*** 0.231***
(0.035) (0.211) (0.068) (0.074)
Country/region effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.802 0.710 0.781 0.782
p value AR (1) test – – 0.023 0.024
p value AR (2) test – – 0.250 0.253
p value Hansen test – – 0.165 0.144
Number of observations 751 751 751 751
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higher prices. In the IV specifications, the long run estimates of fuel subsidy distortions 
on retail prices are − 1.37 and − 1.40, compared to the long-run mark-up from market 
power 0.19 and 0.18.
At first glance, the distortions arising from petroleum subsidies appear to outweigh 
the effects of market concentration. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, treating the three 
long-run estimates in Table 2 as the sources of retail gasoline price shocks, the price 
distortions from fuel subsidies exceed the combined effect of price shocks arising from 
cost pass-through and market power—a striking finding from the analysis. We explore 
the implications of these findings in greater detail in Sect. 7.3.
7.3  Robustness Checks
Despite the IV strategy adopted in this study, there might be concerns that our results 
simply reflect heterogeneity between oil-rich and less-endowed countries in the sample. 
To address these concerns, we undertake additional robustness checks on our findings by 
restricting our sample to a subset of less-endowed countries (i.e. countries with fuel share 
of export less than 10%) and re-estimating the models in Table 2. The results of the re-esti-
mated pass-through regressions are presented in Table 3. As seen in the results presented 
in this table, the estimates from the restricted model are slightly different, quantitatively, 
the results are quite similar in qualitative terms: the subsidy distortions are still negative 
and larger than the market power distortions and shocks from marginal cost. These findings 
suggest that our instrumentation strategy is robust to heterogeneity and endogeneity con-
cerns, as well as to our data sampling.28
7.4  Market Demand Estimations
In order to derive the semi-elasticity of gasoline demand 𝜕 ln Ynt∕𝜕Pdnt = ?̂?, we estimate 
(11) with the price variable in levels while the other variables are in log transformations. 
The market demand regressions are presented in Table 4. The endogeneity of prices in the 
econometric estimation of gasoline demand should be apparent now given the influence of 
domestic fuel pricing policy (subsidies) on retail gasoline prices. Yet, identifying the semi-
elasticity of demand is an important input in our empirical analysis. For this reason, we 
explore a GMM estimation for the estimated demand model.
The coefficient on lagged gasoline demand is 0.74 (again falls between the OLS and 
FE estimates), indicating a sluggish adjustment process which is consistent with the intui-
tion that changes in energy use usually adjust partially towards their expected long-run, in 
response to changes in prices, income, technology and so forth. We estimate short-run and 
long-run semi-elasticities at the sample mean at values of − 0.11 and − 0.42, respectively. 
The semi-elasticities imply that a $1 increase in gasoline prices across sampled countries, 
where the sample mean price is US$PPP 1.16 (i.e. an 86% increase) resulted in a 11% 
decline in consumption in the short run. In the long-run, the response increased to 42%. 
The main implication of these findings is the inelastic demand for gasoline.
28 Further robustness tests are presented in the “Appendix”.
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7.5  Key Market Parameters
Now we examine the central parameter estimates of our long-run market measures and the 
countervailing trade-off reflecting second-best policy outcomes; these are given in Table 5. 
Three hypotheses are central to this paper which has examined retail gasoline markets 
in emerging economies during the period 2000–2013, a period of intense world interest 
in climate change and the United Nations climate change conferences. We have rejected 
the null hypothesis that retail gasoline markets are competitive. We have rejected the null 
hypothesis that there is complete pass-through from marginal cost to retail gasoline prices, 
certainly in the short run. We have also rejected the null hypothesis that there is no subsidy 
Table 3  Pass-through regressions (restricted sample)
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signifi-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in 
the first differenced residuals. These are asymptotically distributed N(0,1) under the null of no serial cor-
relation. Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically Chi square distributed under the 
null of instrument validity. Chi square p value are reported
Dep.var: Pd
nt
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pd
nt−1
0.273*** 0.126*** 0.167*** 0.169***
(0.107) (0.017) (0.031) (0.031)
Pw
nt
≡ MCnt 0.617*** 1.082*** 0.879*** 0.855***
(0.170) (0.136) (0.192) (0.193)
Snt − 1.123*** − 0.912*** − 1.164*** − 1.167***
(0.173) (0.035) (0.151) (0.153)
HHInt 0.168*** 0.030 0.165* 0.161*
(0.044) (0.143) (0.092) (0.094)
Stocknt − 0.001 −  0.019*** − 0.019** − 0.019***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.185** 0.208*** 0.161 0.161
(0.073) (0.130) (0.133) (0.133)
Long-run Estimates
Pass-through 0.849*** 1.239*** 1.055*** 1.029***
(0.148) (0.144) (0.208) (0.211)
Subsidy − 1.547*** − 1.044*** − 1.398*** − 1.404***
(0.184) (0.041) (0.177) (0.181)
Market concentration 0.232*** 0.035 0.198* 0.194*
(0.049) (0.163) (0.109) (0.113)
Country/region effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.672 0.583 0.644 0.646
p value AR (1) test – – 0.110 0.106
p value AR (2) test – – 0.091 0.095
p value Hansen test – – 0.981 0.972
Number of observations 463 463 463 463
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effect in retail gasoline markets. These broad conclusions point to two types of possible 
inefficiency in the allocation of resources: market failure and policy/government failure. 
Using the central estimates in Table 5, we present the key parameters in the analysis and 
we consider each of these hypotheses in turn.
The first hypothesis to be rejected is that the retail gasoline market is completely com-
petitive. We show that the retail gasoline market is strongly driven by income change; it is 
also responsive to price change, but the response is inelastic. We parameterised the semi-
elasticity of market demand, 휂 , in order to identify the role of market power which has two 
parametric components: the first is the market conduct parameter, 훩 , which is then scaled 
up by the inverse of the semi-elasticity of demand. The semi-elasticity was estimated at 
-0.42, so that the market elasticity, 휀 , is − 0.49 if normalised to the sample mean. This 
semi-elasticity of demand parameter is essential to identifying the market conduct param-
eter in the price equation, and this market conduct parameter lies in the unit interval (zero 
in the case of a completely competitive market, and one in the case of pure monopoly).
We estimate the long run value of the market conduct parameter in Table 5 to be 0.122, 
significantly greater than zero at the 5% level of significance on a one-tail test. Therefore, 
while the retail gasoline market is on average not perfectly competitive, at the same time, 
strong market power mark-up is not a dominant feature of the market at this level. Scal-
ing up the estimate: ?̂? = 0.122 by the inverse semi-elasticity: ?̂? = 0.411 and multiplying by 
the sample mean of the concentration index: HHI = 0.642, we find that the market power 
Table 4  Empirical results for 
market demand regressions lnYnt
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals. These are asymptotically 
distributed N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test 
of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically Chi square dis-
tributed under the null of instrument validity. Chi square p value are 
reported
OLS
(1)
FE
(2)
IV
(3)
Ynt−1 0.949*** 0.547*** 0.741***
(0.014) (0.105) (0.146)
Pd
nt
− 0.045** − 0.104*** − 0.094*
(0.022) (0.037) (0.055)
Incnt 0.055*** 0.302* 0.300*
(0.019) (0.156) (0.170)
Popnt 0.048*** 0.261 0.225*
(0.015) (0.228) (0.136)
Long-run semi-elasticity − 1.030* − 0.266** − 0.422*
(0.556) (0.112) (0.224)
Country effects – Yes Yes
Time effects – Yes Yes
R2 0.989 0.980 0.985
p value AR (1) test – – 0.002
p value AR (2) test – – 0.048
p value Hansen test – – 0.370
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component in the price level equation increases the market price at the sample mean by 
0.191 $USPPP or about 16.47% of the retail price of gasoline at the sample mean. We con-
clude therefore that while a degree of market power is exercised, it is only relatively weak: 
market power mark-up is statistically significant but not quantitatively dominant. We see 
this clearly when we examine the other determinants of the retail price: marginal cost pass-
through and subsidies.
The second null hypothesis that engages our attention is that marginal cost is completely 
passed through to retail prices in the domestic gasoline market. Using the linear price equa-
tion model of Table 2, where the short run pass-through of retail price with respect to mar-
ginal cost is 0.67, we reject the hypothesis that this short run pass-through elasticity is not 
significantly different from unity at the 1% level of significance. However, in the long run 
results indicate that only just over 8 cent from a 10 cent shock to marginal cost was passed 
through to retail gasoline consumers during the period 2000–2013,29 despite the evidence 
of some, albeit muted, market power.30 It might be argued that mitigating the pass-through 
of rising international prices to retail domestic prices is an effective second-best counter-
vailing policy designed to reduce the impact of market power on the efficient allocation 
of resources; however, this degree of policy offset considerably exceeds the adjustment 
needed for a second-best optimal replacement, and it is possible that an income redistribu-
tion objective is the main determinant of this degree of retail price offset.
The third hypothesis to be investigated pertains to the question of whether there was 
no additional impact on retail gasoline prices from direct fuel subsidy effects. Again, the 
results in Table 2 and 3 decisively reject this hypothesis. In fact, the distortion (price-reduc-
ing) effect of these gasoline subsidies exceed the sum of the shocks from pass-through and 
market power. Since these subsidies are most often used by countries with large natural 
resource endowments, it could be argued that their governments are using gasoline subsi-
dies to directly redistribute the wealth represented by the natural resource endowment to 
gasoline consumers. Whether heavily subsidised gasoline consumers are the most deserv-
ing candidates for wealth redistribution is clearly outside the scope of this paper.
In column 4 of Table 5, we calculate the policy trade-offs that are implicit in the esti-
mates in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The long run estimate of the ratio for 훼2∕훼3 is − 5.51. This is 
the trade-off between gasoline subsidies on the retail price versus the market power impact 
from concentration. The subsidy overcompensates for market power to the order of 4.5, and 
this is in addition to the reduced pass-through of marginal cost. Again, this reinforces the 
notion above that fuel-subsidizing countries (mostly oil-rich nations) in our sample, give 
their gasoline consumers retail prices that are a small fraction of international prices.31 
Also, in Table 5, the long run estimate of the ratio for 훼2∕훼1 is − 1.63 which indicates that 
gasoline subsidies in our sample more than compensate for cost pass-through.
7.6  Policy Implications: Market Failure versus Government Failure
How can these empirical findings be related to economic policy making? Typically in 
emerging economies, there might be at least four objectives in framing energy policy: (a) 
29 This was a period of generally rising international oil prices.
30 This reduction in the pass-through of marginal cost already wipes out 83% of the mark-up on price due 
to market power.
31 This is consistent with the reality that, in those countries the dominant gasoline retailers are often state-
owned enterprises who have little or no incentive to maximise refinery margins.
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mitigate the effect of market power on retail gasoline prices; (b) signal the social marginal 
cost of gasoline consumption arising from its impact on climate change; (c) redistribute 
income to the poorest consumers by preventing the full pass-through of international prices 
or marginal gasoline costs; (d) monetise the natural resource wealth endowment for the 
whole population through subsidy of retail gasoline prices.
The first two objectives address the issue of market failure in the efficient allocation of 
resources, and there is potential for inefficiency if these policies are poorly designed. The 
third and fourth objectives address the issue of income and wealth distribution and there is 
potential for policy-failure or government-failure if these are poorly designed. On the other 
hand, the theory of the second-best tells us that departures from efficient marginal cost-based 
prices in one direction can be compensated by off-setting adjustments to the price-marginal 
cost ratio in the opposite direction to achieve a second-best allocation of resources.32
In considering the first two objectives, there is a trade-off between mitigating market 
power and signalling the cost of climate change, encapsulated in the well-known saying 
that the monopolist is the conservationist’s friend—see Medlock (2011) for a discussion of 
this idea. In this sample, we find that market power is present but muted, and as a conse-
quence, retail gasoline prices may not align well with the levels required for vigorous anti-
climate change policy.33
Turning to the third and fourth objectives, second-best policy would support some con-
sumption subsidy or offset to retail prices in order to meet equity considerations for con-
sumers if there is strong market power. However, while we find mild upward price distor-
tions from market concentration, the second-best equity-based subsidy offset to mitigate 
the estimated distortion from market power is, on average, highly excessive.
Figure 2 offers a visual evolution of the comparative size of both distortions across the 
subsidisers in our sample using the average elasticity-form estimates for market power and 
subsidies. It is shown that the excessive downward price distortion from subsidies versus 
market power mark-up was persistent and generally growing over the period under consid-
eration.34 Therefore, we conclude that the potential for policy failure has strongly exceeded 
the potential for market failure in this sample.
8  Concluding Remarks
What did we do in this paper? The purpose was to investigate whether there is a counter-
vailing offset from the two major sources of market distortions in petroleum markets for a 
sample of 68 developing economies over the period 2000-2013. We explored the possibil-
ity that these two offsetting distortions can conceivably achieve a second-best optimum. 
We began by setting out a model of price determination identifying three key determinants 
of the observed retail gasoline prices: the extent of pass-through of marginal cost; policy-
based subsidy and refiner market power, conditional on the Herfindahl–Hirschman concen-
tration index. Identifying the market conduct parameter requires a simultaneous equation 
model of price setting and market demand. Since we have access to international marginal 
32 See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), Farrell (1958) and Davis and Whinston (1962) for classic treatments.
33 It can be argued that current levels of retail gasoline prices across sampled countries are unlikely to 
internalise the marginal environmental damage caused by increased gasoline consumption.
34 Clearly it can be seen that the subsidy effect declined in the period 2008/09, possibly in response to the 
global financial crisis which led to declines in commodity prices and which might have constrained national 
spending/budgets on fuel subsidies..
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cost data, the model is recursive. This allowed us to identify market conduct and semi-
elasticity of demand (the two components of refiner market power) and to model the lagged 
adjustment of the gasoline market.
We conclude from the empirical estimation that market power is present but that its effect 
is relatively weak in the sense that the resulting upward distortion of prices above marginal 
costs is strongly exceeded by the countervailing downward distortion of prices below mar-
ginal cost arising from incomplete pass-through and from additional fuel price subsidies. 
Both the incomplete short run pass-through effect and the subsidy effect are statistically sig-
nificant to a strong degree. We discussed whether there were second-best grounds for this 
kind of off-set to prices, but the off-set seems to be excessive for the market power distortion 
that we measured. The motivation for the large off-set to marginal costs could be based on 
equity or endowment-distribution reasons, but in any case, the off-set runs strongly counter 
to the optimal policies for signalling the social marginal cost of climate change. We con-
clude that in energy policy there is the potential for two kinds of inefficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources, market failure and policy failure; and we argue that the empirical effect of 
policy failure far exceeds the measured impact of market failure in this sample of countries.
Finally, this study examines the countervailing distortions arising from fuel subsidies 
and refiner market power in petroleum markets across a sample of developing countries. It 
is important to examine the offsets for other widely subsidised energy products, especially 
electricity which often imposes similar economic costs on the economy. Secondly, quanti-
fying the impact of these offsets on future/projected petroleum related carbon emissions is 
crucial to the cost–benefit analysis of fuel subsidy reforms.
Our analysis is for a historical period up to 2013. Clearly there has been some dereg-
ulation of fuel markets in developing countries recently. Therefore, the question arises 
whether the distortion in price signals is likely to be maintained in future. Much depends 
on the trade-off involved in replacing administered pricing by state-owned companies with 
deregulated pricing by new private sector entrants, and whether governments disturbed by 
popular opposition to the subsequent price rises will revert to further off-setting subsidy. 
Further research is needed into this continuously evolving and important issue.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
Table 6  Classification of 
countries in the data sample 
based on oil endowment
Country classification is based on Venables (2016)
Classification Country
Oil-rich Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Cote d’ Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, 
Sudan
Non-oil Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Dem. Rep. Congo, 
Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Haiti, India, Kenya, L.A.O. PDR, 
Lesotho, Lithuania Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozam-
bique Namibia, Nepal, Nicara-
gua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia
Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia
Table 7  Definition of variables and sources
Variable Definition Source
Retail gasoline price Inflation-adjusted retail gasoline price (US $ per 
litre)
IMF
Marginal supply cost of 
gasoline
Inflation-adjusted ex-refinery hub price (US $ per 
litre)
IMF
Gasoline demand Gasoline consumption (thousand barrels per day) EIA
Per capita income GDP per capita in 2011 US $ ppp WDI
Population Total population (number of people in millions) WDI
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI)
Derived from domestic production & fuel imports World refinery survey
Fuel subsidy Domestic minus international reference price (US $ 
per litre)
Authors calculation
Stock changes Stocks at the beginning minus year end stocks (mtoe) IEA
Resource endowment Petroleum reserves, bbl EIA
Resource endowment (2) Fuel share of total export (%) WTO
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Table 8  Top fuel subsidisers in 
2013
IMF (2015)
By dollar value By share of GDP
Rank Country Total subsi-
dies ($B)
Country Share of 
GDP (%)
1 Russia 127.6 Iran 17.1
2 Indonesia 72.9 Libya 14.9
3 Iran 62.9 Algeria 9.1
4 Malaysia 20.5 Indonesia 8.4
5 Algeria 19.4 Oman 8.2
6 Libya 9.8 Bolivia 8.2
7 Ecuador 7.7 Ecuador 8.1
8 Angola 7.3 Malaysia 6.5
9 Nigeria 6.6 Russia 6.1
10 Oman 6.3 Angola 5.9
Table 9  First stage of IV 
regression
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively
Dependent var: S
nt
(1) (2)
Endownt 0.003*** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.000]
Country effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald F-test 80.36 423.49
Instrument Reservesnt Fuelsharent
1644 M. O. Adetutu, T. G. Weyman-Jones 
1 3
References
Alm J, Sennoga E, Skidmore M (2009) Perfect competition, urbanization, and tax incidence in the retail 
gasoline market. Econ Inq 47(1):118–134
Angelini P, Cetorelli N (2003) The effects of regulatory reform on competition in the banking industry. J 
Money Credit Bank 35(5):663–684
Appelbaum E (1982) The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power. J Econom 19(2):287–299
Arellano M, Bond S (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an applica-
tion to employment equations. Rev Econ Stud 58(2):277–297
Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components mod-
els. J Econom 68(1):29–51
Asplund M, Eriksson R, Friberg R (2000) Price adjustments by a gasoline retail chain. Scand J Econ 
102(1):101–121
Atil A, Lahiani A, Nguyen K (2014) Asymmetric and nonlinear pass-through of crude oil prices to gasoline 
and natural gas prices. Energy Policy 65(3):567–573
Bachmeier L, Griffin J (2003) New evidence on asymmetric gasoline price responses. Rev Econ Stat 
85(3):772–776
Bacon R, Kojima M (2010) Rockets and feathers: asymmetric petroleum product pricing in developing 
countries. Extractive Industries for Development Series, 18
Baig T, Coady D, Ntamatungiro J, Mati A (2007) Domestic petroleum product prices and subsidies: Recent 
developments and reform strategies. International Monetary Fund. IMF Working Paper No. 07/71
Barrera-Rey F (1995) The effects of vertical integration on oil company performance
Table 10  IV regression in levels
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals. These are asymptotically 
distributed N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test 
of the over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically Chi square dis-
tributed under the null of instrument validity. Chi square p value are 
reported
Dep.var: Pd
nt
(1) (2)
Pd
nt−1
0.175*** 0.175***
(0.010) (0.022)
Pw
nt
≡ MCnt 0.945*** 0.943***
(0.131) (0.117)
Snt − 0.474*** − 0.455***
(0.118) (0.117)
HHInt 0.070*** 0.076***
(0.018) (0.019)
Stocknt − 0.001*** − 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Country/region effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Instrument Reserves Fuel export
R2 0.722 0.721
p value AR (1) test 0.004 0.005
p valuep value AR (2) test 0.191 0.190
p value Hansen test 0.300 0.202
Number of observations 751 751
1645Fuel Subsidies Versus Market Power: Is There a Countervailing…
1 3
Beers CV, Strand J (2013) Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing. World Bank Policy Research Work-
ing Paper 6470
Blundell R, Bond S (2000) GMM estimation with persistent panel data: an application to production func-
tions. Econ Rev 19(3):321–340
Bond S (2002) Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data methods and practice. Port Econ J 
1(2):141–162
Borenstein S, Shepard A (2002) Sticky prices, inventories, and market power in wholesale gasoline markets. 
RAND J Econ 33(1):116–139
Borenstein S, Cameron AC, Gilbert R (1997) Do gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude oil price 
changes? Q J Econ 112(1):305–339
Bresnahan TF (1982) The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Econ Lett 10(1):87–92
Coady D, Gillingham R, Ossowski R, Piotrowski J, Tareq S, Tyson J (2010) Petroleum product subsidies: 
Costly, inequitable, and rising. International Monetary Fund Staff Position Note 10/05
Coady D, Parry I, Sears L, Shang B (2017) How large are global fossil fuel subsidies? World Dev 91:11–27
Corts KS (1999) Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power. J Econ 88(2):227–250
Davis LW (2014) The economic cost of global fuel subsidies. Am Econ Rev 104(5):581–585
Davis OA, Whinston A (1962) Externalities, welfare, and the theory of games. J Polit Econ 70(3):241–262
Delis MD, Tsionas EG (2009) The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency. J Bank 
Finance 33(10):1842–1850
Farrell MJ (1958) In defence of public-utility price theory. Oxford Econ Pap 10(1):109–123
Hall RE (1988) The relation between price and marginal cost in US industry. J Polit Econ 96(5):921–947
Hansen L (1982) Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econometrica 
50(3):1029–1054
IMF (2013) Case studies on energy subsidy reform: lessons and implications. IMF Policy Paper January 
2013
IMF (2015) How large are global energy subsidies? IMF Working Paper WP/15/105
International Energy Agency (IEA) (1999) World Energy Outlook 1999, Looking at Energy Subsidies: Get-
ting the Prices Right. IEA, Paris
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2012) World energy outlook 2012. International Energy Agency, WEO, 
p 2012
Kojima M (2012) Oil price risks and pump price adjustments. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
WPS6227, World Bank
Kojima M, Matthews W, Sexsmith F (2010) Petroleum markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank and 
ESMAP, Washington, DC
Kutlu L, Sickles RC (2012) Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies. J Econ 
168(1):141–155
Larsen B, Shah A (1992) World fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon emissions. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1002
Lau LJ (1982) On identifying the degree of competitiveness from industry price and output data. Econ Lett 
10(1):93–99
Leibenstein H (1966) Allocative efficiency vs. “X-efficiency”. American Econ Rev 56(3):392–415
Lipsey RG, Lancaster K (1956) The general theory of second-best. Rev Econ Stud 24(1):11–32
Lopez RA, Azzam AM, Lirón-España C (2002) Market power and/or efficiency: A structural approach. Rev 
Ind Org 20(2):115–126
Marchak V (2003) Determinants of vertical integration in oil industry: Case of transition economies. Mas-
ters Thesis, Economics education and research consortium (EERC)
Marion J, Muehlegger E (2011) Fuel tax incidence and supply conditions. J Publ Econ 95(9):1202–1212
Martin S (1988) Market power and/or efficiency? Rev Econ Stat 70(2):331–335
Medlock KB (2011) The economics of energy supply. In: Hunt LC, Joanne E (eds) International handbook 
on the economics of energy, vol 3. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
Meyler A (2009) The pass through of oil prices into euro area consumer liquid fuel prices in an environment 
of high and volatile oil prices. Energy Econ 31(6):867–881
Nakamura E, Zerom D (2010) Accounting for incomplete pass-through. Rev Econ Stud 77(3):1192–1230
Newbery DM (1995) Power markets and market power. Energy J 16(3):39–66
OECD (2013) Competition in road fuel. Organisation for economic co-operation and development, OECD 
DAF/COMP, 18
Parry IW, Heine MD, Lis E, Li S (2014) Getting energy prices right: from principle to practice. Interna-
tional monetary fund
Plante M (2014) The long-run macroeconomic impacts of fuel subsidies. J Dev Econ 107:129–143
Roodman D (2009) A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bull Econ Stat 71(1):135–158
1646 M. O. Adetutu, T. G. Weyman-Jones 
1 3
Shaffer S (1993) A test of competition in Canadian banking. J Money Credit Bank 25(1):49–61
Sharma D, Gundimeda H (2017) Market structure and performance of downstream oil industry: a case study 
of Indian National oil companies. In: International Association for Energy Economics 2017 papers and 
proceedings
van Benthem A (2015) Energy leapfrogging. J Assoc Energy Resour Econ 2(1):93–132
Venables AJ (2016) Using natural resources for development: why has it proven so difficult? J Econ Per-
spect 30(1):161–184
Weyl EG, Fabinger M (2013) Pass-through as an economic tool: principles of incidence under imperfect 
competition. J Polit Econ 121(3):528–583
Windmeijer F (2005) A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estima-
tors. J econ 126(1):25–51
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
